In a previous post, we showed the strategic targets during the Battle of Britain period. This post shows the tactical targets.
Luftwaffe doctrine called for achieving air superiority, or better yet, air supremacy first, as indicated in L.Dv.16 (Luftwaffe's official doctrine):
"The enemy air force is to be fought from the beginning of the war … An offensive execution of the battle in enemy’s territory is indispensable. The aerial battle will gain the initiative over the enemy".
Therefore, the enemy AF should be attacked first (on the airfields, in the air, and wherever there was command and control, and logistical infrastructure that facilitated the enemy's operations).
Once the Luftwaffe had achieved superiority, the strategic targets could be attacked at whim during a second phase.
After 10 months of the war, this doctrine had proved successful as long as it was supported by the German ground troops because it created a virtuous cycle:
(1) Causing damage to the enemy air force reduced enemy sorties over the panzer units
(2) This helped the panzer units to advance and forced the enemy air force to vacate its airfields
(3) which reduced offensive sorties and permitted the Luftwaffe to maintain the initiative
For the 1st time, the Luftwaffe faced a serious environment that included:
1) No help from the army
2) Luftwaffe's attacks needed to be quite destructive (since the British could repair the damage with little hindrance, since they were not pressured by an enemy's advancing army)
3) The short range of the Bf 109 forced a frontal assault against the best-defended enemy sector
4) Numerical superiority was marginal (in terms of single-engine fighters there was a tactical parity)
5) It would be difficult to entice the RAF to do battle in German terms
Unknown to the Luftwaffe they faced other important problems:
a) Fighter Command command had larger reserves, higher production output, and fewer losses than estimated by the German Intelligence department
b) British intel was ahead (part of this was Ultra, but in addition, there were other initiatives that were providing GB with a flow of information)
c) Fighter Command could define what loss rate it was able to accept (if the loss rate increased beyond a certain threshold, it could use airfields beyond the Bf 109 operational radius)
d) German production rate was low
e) Radar gave FC a C3 (command, communication, and control) advantage
The map shows FC's 12 sector, 12 satellite, and 10 secondary airfields, & the 25 radar posts in the ops. area.

The Germans would need to attack them first to destroy British aircraft on the ground and in the air, and to damage the supporting infrastructure that helped FC to be efficient.