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Adolf Galland early career
At the end of March 1940, Hauptmann A. Galland, TO of JG 27 was still a young officer without combat experience in the Bf 109. He fought in Poland with the Hs 123 attack airplane. And now he was helping shape JG 27 into an effective fighter formation. He felt his lack of experience in fighter combat was hindering his ability to do that.
Therefore, he called his friend Hauptmann W. Moelders, Gruppenkommandeure of III. /JG 53 for help. Galland was detached temporarily to JG 53 where Moelders taught his friend the basics of air combat while the unit engaged French fighters on the border areas during the ‘Phoney war”. Galland even entered combat a couple of times but failed to score (but he survived combat, which is a success in itself).
He learned a great deal about the organization of JG 53 that was transferable to JG 27 and was quite impressed with the rudimentary fighter control system implemented by Moelders, who had set up an observation post on a favorable location near the border that was able to inform his unit of enemy activity and vector his unit to interception by radio. This system, although useful, compared badly with the one implemented by RAF’s FC which had already a sophisticated ground-controlled interception system (GCI) consisting of radar, observation posts, command centers (where this information was received, and decisions were made, and implemented), and other important elements along the whole breadth and width of the United Kingdom.
The German defensive arrangements were at least one year behind the British because the Luftwaffe thought in offensive terms, and in this aspect the Lw was at least one year ahead: fighters were meant to protect advancing panzers (in known geographical areas) and bombers (using free sweeps ahead of the bombers or patrolling a certain sector and providing support to any friendly aircraft encountered). Both missions did not require GCI.
Galland learned a great deal, and after Dunkirk, already a 12-victory ace, he was promoted to lead III./JG26, in time for the second phase of the Battle of France (see pic of Galland’s E-3 on 14 Aug 40).
Therefore, he called his friend Hauptmann W. Moelders, Gruppenkommandeure of III. /JG 53 for help. Galland was detached temporarily to JG 53 where Moelders taught his friend the basics of air combat while the unit engaged French fighters on the border areas during the ‘Phoney war”. Galland even entered combat a couple of times but failed to score (but he survived combat, which is a success in itself).
He learned a great deal about the organization of JG 53 that was transferable to JG 27 and was quite impressed with the rudimentary fighter control system implemented by Moelders, who had set up an observation post on a favorable location near the border that was able to inform his unit of enemy activity and vector his unit to interception by radio. This system, although useful, compared badly with the one implemented by RAF’s FC which had already a sophisticated ground-controlled interception system (GCI) consisting of radar, observation posts, command centers (where this information was received, and decisions were made, and implemented), and other important elements along the whole breadth and width of the United Kingdom.
The German defensive arrangements were at least one year behind the British because the Luftwaffe thought in offensive terms, and in this aspect the Lw was at least one year ahead: fighters were meant to protect advancing panzers (in known geographical areas) and bombers (using free sweeps ahead of the bombers or patrolling a certain sector and providing support to any friendly aircraft encountered). Both missions did not require GCI.
Galland learned a great deal, and after Dunkirk, already a 12-victory ace, he was promoted to lead III./JG26, in time for the second phase of the Battle of France (see pic of Galland’s E-3 on 14 Aug 40).
